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Evaluating NATO Enlargement: 
Scholarly Debates, Policy Implications, and Roads Not Taken 
 




NATO’s enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War is the subject of 
significant debate in academic and policy circles. With few exceptions, however, this debate 
focuses on single issues, such as whether enlargement led to the decline of the West’s relations 
with Russia. In this framing document, we look to expand the debate. We do so by sequentially 
reviewing the process by which NATO enlarged, outlining the array of issue areas within which 
to assess the consequences of NATO enlargement, and highlighting the particular importance of 
counterfactual analysis to any judgment of enlargement’s legacy. Building on a May 2019 
workshop at Boston University, we also summarize the results of several articles that collectively 
evaluate the consequence of expansion for the United States, Russia, non-US NATO members, 
and the organization itself. Finally, we conclude by outlining elements of a broader research 
program on the aftereffects of NATO enlargement. 
 
Introduction 
NATO’s enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe—including to states that were formerly part 
of the Soviet Union itself—has been among the preeminent features of post–Cold War US foreign 
policy and European security. It has also been among the most controversial. When NATO 
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hosted by Boston University. Thanks also go to Stephen Dyer for his research assistance. This work was developed 
for a workshop funded partly by the Charles Koch Foundation. On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author 
states that there is no conflict of interest. 
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enlargemen was first broached in the 1990s, proponents advanced a range of interrelated 
propositions to argue that enlargement would broadly help stabilize Europe east of Germany while 
facilitating the spread of democracy and market capitalism (Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee 1995; 
Flanagan 1992; Lukes 1999; Asmus, Kugler, and Flanagan 1993). Critics, however, countered that 
enlargement would require NATO’s existing members to defend a host of Central and Eastern 
European states of questionable strategic value, would antagonize Russia, and in any case was not 
as important for spreading democracy and capitalism as the European Union (Brown 1995; Waltz 
2000; Reiter 2001; MccGwire 1998; Kennan 1997). Several rounds of expansion later, these 
debates remain broadly intact. Advocates of continued enlargement see NATO’s ongoing growth 
as central to consolidating the US-led liberal order and countering an increasingly assertive Russia, 
whereas skeptics see NATO as a core impediment to improved East-West relations and as 
superfluous to European stability (Kupchan 2019; Daalder 2017; Walt 2018; Bandow 2019). In 
short, nearly three decades after NATO enlargement began, its merits and drawbacks remain as up 
for debate as ever. 
Without claiming to resolve the NATO enlargement debate, this special issue looks to 
advance the conversation by assessing the impact of expansion—for better and for worse—on 
NATO as an institution, on Russia and its relations with the West, on the new member states of 
Central and Eastern Europe, on the United States, and on contemporary European security affairs. 
This effort carries both scholarly and policy implications. On one level, by distinguishing among 
enlargement’s international, domestic, and institutional consequences, we hope to sharpen the 
contours of the dialogue by bringing fresh evidence—including an array of primary sources—to 
bear on the precise ways in which enlargement has variously affected transatlantic, European, and 
national politics.  
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At the same time, in an era when many analysts believe NATO’s future is in doubt because 
of the skepticism expressed by US president Donald Trump and French president Emmanuel 
Macron, and the counterreaction by other NATO leaders including German chancellor Angela 
Merkel, assessing enlargement’s legacy offers insight into the ways in which a fundamental change 
in European security structures may or may not affect the political life of the continent (Economist 
2019; Brennan 2019; Reuters 2017; Heisbourg 2016). Ultimately, the more NATO enlargement is 
judged to have played a central role in stabilizing Eastern Europe, deterring Russian revanchism, 
structuring the politics of the alliance itself, or consolidating postcommunist domestic orders in 
former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states, the more likely that there will objections to altering 
NATO’s role in Europe. Conversely, the less NATO’s role is viewed as necessary or beneficial 
across these broad issues, the more room there will be for those who envision a withering of that 
role. In short, assessing the legacy of NATO enlargement is more than just a reconsideration of 
water under the bridge; it promises to provide insight into deliberations surrounding NATO’s 
future. 
This is not the first effort to assess the consequences of NATO’s eastward move. Still, 
much of the existing discussion has remained at one of two poles: that NATO remains an 
indispensable alliance or—conversely—that it is the source of many problems in the world, 
especially the souring of Russia’s relations with the West (Mearsheimer 2014; Posen 2014; 
Vershbow 2014; Kramer, Binnendijk, and Hamilton 2015, 3; Brands 2019; Cancian and Cancian 
2019). That said, work by Kimberly Marten (2018), and others (German 2017; Poast and 
Urpelainen 2018), has increasingly sought to engage the consequences of NATO’s eastward move. 
These projects all make valuable contributions to the intellectual and policy debate. Still, even 
these studies tend to focus on individual aspects of expansion in support of particular research 
 4 
questions. Although appropriate for the work at hand, the result leaves analysts without a net 
assessment of enlargement’s consequences across the multiple issues and actors involved in the 
enlargement debate. Moreover, any analysis of NATO enlargement relies on more or less explicit 
causal and counterfactual claims. Accordingly, it is worth attempting to directly analyze the 
course, conduct, and consequences of NATO enlargement to precisely identify enlargement’s 
effects on European and transatlantic politics while considering the costs and benefits of possible 
alternatives to enlargement. Not only is this approach needed to ensure analytically rigorous and 
robust results, but it helps advance the state of debate for policymakers and scholars. 
The remainder of this introductory article proceeds in five sections. First, it reviews the 
origins and history of NATO enlargement to frame the debate over enlargement’s legacy. Second, 
it delineates the core issues on which analysts could assess NATO expansion and discusses the 
specific issues addressed in this exercise. Third, the article highlights the importance of 
counterfactual analysis in assessing the consequences of NATO enlargement. Fourth, it 
summarizes the results from the studies presented in this project. Finally, it briefly outlines avenues 
for future research. 
 
NATO Enlargement: Review and Reprise 
NATO enlargement developed over the course of the early to mid 1990s as NATO member states 
and former Central and Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact contemplated Europe’s 
post–Cold War security order (Goldgeier 1999; Sarotte 2019a; Brown 1999). At the time, it was 
not obvious that NATO itself would persist in the post–Cold War world given the collapse of the 
communist threat it was founded to counter (Mearsheimer 1990; Cornish 2004; Sayle 2019; Waltz 
1993, 76). If it did survive—so the logic went—it might need to transform into a largely political 
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organization that would have more in common with the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE) than the tight military alliance that existed during the Cold War (Kupchan and 
Kupchan 1991, 153–155; Duffield 1994/95, 766–772; Daalder 1999, chap. 1). 
 Lost in the deliberations over NATO’s continuation were signs that NATO might not only 
survive but expand after the Cold War (Wallander 2000; Walt 1997). Preliminary hints came 
during the diplomatic dance surrounding German reunification. Coordinating with West German 
chancellor Helmut Kohl’s administration, the United States under the George H.W. Bush 
administration successfully pushed to keep reunified Germany within NATO (Engel 2017; 
Kornblum 2018). This move not only formally enlarged the alliance east of its Cold War 
boundaries—encompassing the former East Germany, or what the United States referred to as the 
‘jewel in the Soviet imperial crown’—but blocked parallel Soviet efforts to use reunification to 
facilitate the creation of a new, pan-European security order that would see both the Warsaw Pact 
and NATO dissolved (Shifrinson 2018a, 149; Zelikow and Rice 1995). Even as this effort 
continued, several Eastern European states began signaling that they wanted into the alliance, with 
policymakers from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland inquiring about NATO membership 
even at the start of 1990. Within months, US strategists were debating whether the United States 
and existing NATO members should signal ‘to the new democracies of Eastern Europe NATO’s 
readiness to contemplate their future membership’ (Shifrinson 2016, 38). 
 By 1991–1994, the trend lines further clarified as the United States worked assiduously to 
keep NATO a vibrant security institution in post–Cold War Europe, and soon treated NATO 
enlargement as a prime way of doing so (Sayle 2019, chap. 10; Goldgeier 1999). The lessons of 
the twentieth century seemed clear to US policymakers and to many Europeans.  In this logic, the 
United States withdrew from Europe after the 1919 Versailles Treaty formally ended World War 
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I and the result was another world war two decades later; America remained engaged on the 
continent after 1945, and the result was a prosperous and secure Western Europe (Chollet and 
Goldgeier 2008; Engel 2017, 77). Following communism’s collapse, US officials decided that they 
had an opportunity to promote a Europe ‘whole and free’. When they subsequently looked at the 
available institutions, NATO was the clear winner. It was a capable organization that the United 
States dominated, whereas the alternatives—the CSCE and the European Community (soon to 
become the European Union) —lacked either organizational capacity (CSCE) or US access (the 
EC/EU) to fulfill US hopes and ambitions. 
The first steps toward enlargement came in the latter part of the George H.W. Bush 
administration. Amid the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and—subsequently—the Soviet Union, 
US policymakers developed NATO ‘liaison programs’ with former Warsaw Pact states to link 
them to NATO without offering membership. Given concerns with Western European outreach to 
the East, the possibility of a Soviet/Russian resurgence, and continuing calls from Eastern 
European states themselves, by mid-1992 this policy morphed into an effort to signal – as one 
interagency report put it –  ‘the new democracies that we do not rule out extending membership’ 
(quoted in Shifrinson 2020, 51). Soon thereafter, the United States began identifying ‘the 
conditions we want to see met before we consider new applicants to NATO’, while preparing to 
mobilize support among existing allies for expanding the alliance in the near-to-medium term (52). 
The United States, in other words, looked to expand NATO even as the dust settled from the Cold 
War (Flanagan 2019).  
Bush’s defeat in the 1992 US presidential election put these initiatives on hold. The newly 
inaugurated William Clinton administration, however, soon picked up where Bush left off 
(Flanagan 2019; Walker 2019). Despite internal fissures within the administration, President 
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Clinton came to embrace NATO enlargement, seeing it as a way of anchoring the US presence in 
post–Cold War Europe and facilitating what Clinton himself termed the enlargement of the 
‘community of market-based democracies’ (Goldgeier 1999, 39; Clinton 1994; Asmus 2004). 
After first proposing and agreeing on the Partnership for Peace as the primary focus for NATO’s 
outreach east, the Clinton administration’s momentum for enlargement—an outcome favored by 
Republican and Democrats alike—reached a critical mass by the fall of 1994.1 Soon, discussions 
were underway within NATO and with the leaders of various Eastern European states (particularly 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) seeking admission to the alliance (Goldgeier 1999; 
Sarotte 2019b).  
To be sure, efforts to expand the alliance into Eastern Europe were not accepted in all 
quarters. For one thing, although many Eastern European elites were enthused about joining the 
alliance, support was not universal in the former Eastern Bloc. Into early 1993, for example, Czech 
president Václav Havel mused about crafting a pan-European security order that would eliminate 
Cold War–era alliances; likewise, many former communist officials were unenthused about 
integrating with former adversaries (Havránek and Jireš 2019). Still, with Havel coming around 
and Western-oriented leaders such as Poland’s Lech Wałęsa eager to see their countries formally 
join the West, Eastern European support for enlargement coalesced (Sarotte 2019a). More 
intransigent opposition, however, came from Western Europe and Russia. Some Western 
European members of NATO were lukewarm toward the prospect of enlargement. France, in 
particular, viewed expansion as a challenge to European Community (soon to be European Union) 
efforts to craft an independent foreign and security role (Schake 1998). Firm support for 
 
1 In the original logic for Partnership for Peace, the program would offer Eastern European states (and Russia) 
institutional ties to NATO but stop short of full membership.  This approach was favored by the Pentagon as well as 
officials at the State Department who worked on Russia policy. 
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enlargement in Western Europe resided mainly among German national security officials, 
particularly Defense Minister Volker Rühe, who saw an opportunity to ensure that the eastern 
border of Germany would no longer be the eastern border of NATO (Voigt 2019).  
Likewise, Russian leaders—including Russian president Boris Yeltsin—took a dim view 
of NATO’s plans to expand. Even in 1992, US planners recognized that Russian policymakers 
might resist NATO enlargement, seeing it as a step toward redividing Europe (Lowenkron to Howe 
26 March 1992). Still, as NATO enlargement took off, Russian opposition intensified. Already in 
late 1993, for instance, Yeltsin warned Clinton that NATO enlargement would be perceived in 
many Russian circles as ‘a sort of neo-isolation of our country’ (SecState to NATO Posts 9 October 
1993; AmEmbassy Moscow to SecState 20 October 1993). Late 1994 saw the Russian leader flag 
similar issues, cautioning Clinton that enlargement ‘will be interpreted and not only in Russia as 
the beginning of a new split in Europe’ (SecState to AmEmbassy Moscow 6 December 1994), just 
as the Russian president bluntly stated in May 1995 that he saw ‘nothing but humiliation for 
Russia’ if NATO expansion proceeded (Summary Report 10 May 1995). Nor was Yeltsin alone; 
other Russian policymakers, including parliamentary leaders and officials in the Ministry of 
Defense, echoed Yeltsin throughout this period (Secretary of Defense 5 January 1994; Federal 
Assembly 25 April 1995). 
US officials were not unmindful of Russian opposition, but they did not stop the 
enlargement process. Rather, US policy moved along parallel tracks with the United States’ 
Western European partners and Russia. With Western Europe, officials in the Bush and Clinton 
administrations carved out a security role for the EC/EU via the Western European Union, while 
protecting NATO’s prerogatives as the primary forum for European defense and security 
deliberations (NATO 1991; Pond 1992; Shifrinson 2020, 33–54; Sayle 2019, 235–240). This effort 
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limited Western European states’ ability to pursue a separate security policy, creating room for the 
United States to coordinate with European actors open to enlargement and use the resulting 
leverage to drive expansion (Hill 2018, 53–65, 79–87, 109–122). 
At the same time, the Clinton administration coordinated closely with Russian elites, 
listening to their critiques and attempting to convince Yeltsin’s team that enlargement would not 
pose a threat (Talbott 2002; Goldgeier 2018, 46–51). This approach was predicated on Clinton’s 
assumption that Yeltsin’s opposition was primarily due to fears that nationalists at home would 
use NATO enlargement against him politically, rather than being driven by national security 
concerns and  could be assuaged by (1) adjusting the pace of enlargement to suit Yeltsin’s domestic 
political needs, and (2) cooperating with Russia in other venues (Goldgeier forthcoming). To this 
end, the Clinton administration agreed to delay concrete steps on NATO enlargement until after 
the 1996 Russian presidential election; explored ways of limiting the scope NATO enlargement 
(e.g., agreeing that permanent NATO forces would not be posted to Eastern Europe in the near 
term) to make the process more palatable to Russian sensibilities (Hill 2018, 136); and ultimately 
crafted what became the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act as a way of signaling that enlargement 
was not meant to redivide Europe (Carr and Flenley 1999). To the extent that Russian officials 
sincerely viewed enlargement as a threat to the country’s status and/or security rather than as 
political in nature, these steps did not—indeed, could not—address Russian complaints; after all, 
engagement was defined by issues the United States was willing to discuss, on terms decided by 
US policymakers (USDel Secretary to SecState 16 January 1994; O’Hanlon 2017, 5). 
Nevertheless, US efforts were intended to make the outcome more acceptable in the hopes that 
Russia would eventually accommodate itself to a new European security landscape featuring an 
expanded NATO. 
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The net result of Eastern European pressures, US enthusiasm for expansion, and limited 
opportunities for effective Western European and Russian opposition became clear as expansion 
became a reality. NATO’s ‘Study on Enlargement’ was published in September 1995. It 
synthesized the Clinton administration’s discussions within NATO and its outreach to Eastern 
Europe, underscoring that the alliance was open to new members and laying out criteria that states 
would have to meet to join the organization (NATO 1995). Though deference to Russian 
sensitivities delayed immediate followup (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 183–210; Savranskaya and 
Blanton 2018), NATO’s July 1997 Madrid Summit saw the alliance formally invite the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland to begin NATO accession talks. These three states were formally 
admitted to NATO in March 1999.  
This was only the start of an expansion process that continues through the present—as 
former deputy secretary of state William Burns notes, ‘expansion of NATO membership’ has 
‘stayed on autopilot’ since the 1990s (Burns 2019, 413). Indeed, with NATO members on record 
supporting the alliance’s continued growth, and with leading Western officials from the late 1990s 
framing the alliance as a way of contributing to ‘stabilization, stability, and democratization’ in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Hill 2018, 200), NATO’s eastward move had no obvious geographic 
end within Europe (Art 1998, 341–342).2  
With calls for membership continuing in the late 1990s from Eastern European states 
excluded from the first round of enlargement, NATO moved to routinize the enlargement process, 
creating the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in the spring of 1999 to guide future applicants. 
Almost immediately, seven new states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia 
 
2 The 1949 Washington Treaty establishing NATO provided that the alliance was open for invitation to ‘any other 
European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
Atlantic area’. See NATO 1949. 
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and Slovenia) joined the MAP. This began a process that resulted in their formal invitation to begin 
accession talks in 2002 and their admission to the alliance in 2004 (NATO n.d.; NATO 2019). 
From there, NATO turned toward incorporating a range of states in Southeastern Europe, admitting 
states such as Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia from the mid-2000s onward. 
More dramatically, and despite Russia’s warnings that it would strongly oppose the effort, the 
2008 Bucharest Summit saw NATO pledge that Georgia and Ukraine would ‘become members of 
NATO’ (NATO 2008).  In fact, outreach to Ukraine and Georgia remains ongoing despite the fact 
that the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and subsequent Ukraine conflict nominally convinced many 
NATO members that their admission was inadvisable (Ruger 2019). 
Five broad, unstated assumptions appeared to underlie NATO policy. First, with the Soviet 
Union defunct, Russia in decline, and reunified Germany firmly anchored within NATO, the 
prospect of great power war on the continent was virtually nonexistent. As such—second—NATO 
could expand eastward at limited risk while using membership to incentivize Eastern European 
states to embrace and internalize Western domestic institutions and values. Third, in doing so, the 
United States and its partners would construct a growing security system in which war would be 
off the table even as conditions—open markets and pluralist domestic institutions—that reinforced 
Western influence would expand; in effect, expansion would become a perpetual motion machine 
in which Western influence would grow alongside the alliance. Fourth, and partly as a product of 
the preceding, NATO would continue as Europe’s premier security institution, under whose 
auspices other intra-European security institutions might be fostered (the view of some Western 
Europeans) or US dominance reified (the US preference) (Waltz 2000, 28–29). Finally, Russian 
complaints were manageable; provided the United States and its allies reached out, Russia could 
hopefully be convinced to accept a security system that threatened to leave it isolated if it didn’t 
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go along (Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee 1995, 20–25). If not, however, then an enlarged NATO 
would be in a better position to compete with Russia by virtue of its expanded roster and the 
resulting reach.3  
Of course, NATO expansion did not occur in a strategic vacuum. On one level, enlargement 
from the late 1990s onward occurred as East-West relations deteriorated. This deterioration 
stemmed from many sources, including mutual suspicions of the other side’s intentions, worries 
in Moscow that Russian interests were increasingly ignored by NATO member states, and 
concerns in Washington and other Western capitals that Moscow sought to revise Europe’s post–
Cold War settlement (Hill 2018; Stent 2014; Rumer and Sokolosky 2019). Although one might 
have expected these developments to call for a reassessment of the principles undergirding NATO 
expansion, the net effect has reinforced the logic of NATO enlargement. Since the mid-2000s, 
Russian officials from President Vladimir Putin down have highlighted NATO enlargement as a 
particular problem for East-West relations, just as reciprocal fears of Russian behavior have driven 
many NATO members (particularly in Eastern Europe) to focus on using the alliance to confront 
and deter Moscow (Shanker and Landler 2007; Oliphant 2016; Landler and Cooper 2016). In 
effect, this process has redivided Europe as post–Cold War Russian leaders (and many Western 
officals and analysts) once feared. The collapse of East-West relations has thereby given new life 
to an enlarged NATO—in fact, judging from pronouncements by US and allied analysts and 
policymakers, enlargement itself has become a symbol of Western resolve in opposing Moscow 
and sustaining the West’s preferred vision of Europe’s security order (e.g., Burns and Lute 2019). 
At the same time, the EU’s continued inability to create an effective security apparatus exacerbates 
the growing NATO-Moscow standoff, leaving European states seeking a hedge against Russian 
 
3 Clearly, not all of these assumptions are in harmony—the logic faced a number of internal tensions. 
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bellicosity with few alternatives besides the transatlantic alliance, and generating ongoing calls 
from Georgia, Ukraine, and others for further NATO expansion (O’Hanlon 2017, esp. 41–49; 
Jozwiak 2018; RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty 2018). 
To this end, the post-2014 period has seen the alliance expand the scope of its military and 
defense efforts in and around Eastern Europe. Both the Barack Obama and Donald Trump 
administrations allocated billions of dollars to upgrade military infrastructure in NATO’s post–
Cold War member states and called upon other NATO members to match US efforts; military 
exercises focused on securing and defending NATO’s Eastern flank against possible Russian 
aggression are growing (Shifrinson 2018b); rotational troop deployments have accelerated; and 
the permanent stationing of NATO-allocated forces east of Germany is under discussion 
(Hunzeker and Lanoszka 2018). This change is particularly stark considering that NATO 
expansion since the 1990s involved comparatively little effort to prepare for the defense of its new 
members or project military power beyond the German border—the political commitment 
exceeded the alliance’s military reach.4 NATO, having entered the post–Cold War era as an 
alliance primarily between the United States and the states of Western Europe, has expanded the 
alliance politically and (increasingly) militarily up to the border of Russia itself, encompassing an 
array of former Soviet allies and states that were once part of the Soviet Union.  
 
Framing the Debates over Enlargement’s Legacy 
Given this complex history, evaluating the legacy of NATO enlargement is not easy. Large-scale 
and long-lasting policies generally carry multiple consequences, including some unanticipated at 
 
4 Illustrating the point, testimony by Defense Department officials at the time of NATO enlargement focused primarily 
on the budgetary implications of NATO enlargement rather than the tasks of defending new NATO member states; 
see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations 1998, 131–152.  For subsequent military difficulties, see 
Sara Moller’s and Paul Van Hooft’s articles in this issue. 
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the time of the policy’s creation. This is especially true with NATO expansion, where proponents 
and critics of the effort identify a range of positive and negative externalities. As noted, prior 
discussions have tended to focus narrowly on either enlargement’s costs or its benefits, with critics 
making the case that enlargement has caused the collapse of US-Russia relations (and is even 
responsible for provoking the Russian invasion of Ukraine) and proponents praising the policy as 
one of the great success stories of US post–Cold War foreign policy. 
This disinclination to weigh both costs and benefits may be partly paradigmatic. Realist 
scholars tend to downplay the relevance of NATO enlargement’s effects on domestic societies in 
and around Europe to emphasize issues related to European security and great power politics. 
Conversely, constructivists and liberal analysts focus on enlargement’s success in promoting 
Western values (broadly defined), democracy, and capitalism in post–Cold War Europe, rather 
than exclusively (or primarily) evaluating the hard security dimension of expansion. And students 
of policy processes, for their part, have written about the policy management aspects of 
enlargement, including what it tells us about national security decisionmaking in the United States 
and other allied countries and how enlargement has affected NATO as an organization (Brown 
1995; Russett and Stam 1998; Reiter 2001; Epstein 2005; Thies, Hellmuth, and Millen 2006; 
Bunde and Noetzel 2010; Adler 2008).  
Recognizing the limits of single-paradigm treatments, we argue that the NATO 
enlargement debate does not lend itself to identification of a single aspect of enlargement’s legacy 
as its sine qua non. Instead, the distinct approaches and issues embraced by scholars (and NATO 
itself) underscore the need for a broad-based effort to assess different aspects of enlargement across 
different actors in order to arrive at a net assessment of enlargement for any or all of the actors 
involved. A quarter century after enlargement began in earnest, it is time to assess the costs and 
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benefits of the policy and to consider the costs and benefits of potential alternatives proposed for 
securing Western interests, providing security to newly free countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and/or finding a place for Russia in a post–Cold War Europe. The point, in short, is to 
leverage analytic eclecticism to arrive at overarching judgments of the policy. 
Building upon Kenneth Waltz’s ‘levels of analysis’ (1959) approach toward understanding 
the sources of international competition while modifying it for an issue that is as much institutional 
as international, we argue that NATO enlargement’s legacy needs to be analyzed at the 
international level, at the domestic level, and at the organizational level. In doing so, it’s necessary 
to also account for the fact that the consequences of enlargement can vary by the actors involved. 
After all, even if NATO enlargement has antagonized Russia and harmed US-Russian relations, it 
may have also plausibly added to the security enjoyed by different states in Western or Eastern 
Europe; likewise—and as some US policymakers suggest—enlargement may facilitate the 
European allies’ tendency to cheap-ride on the United States, but subsequently give the United 
States greater influence over European security debates (Posen 2014; Layne 2001; Tonelson 2001). 
Moreover, and as emphasized below, it is important to keep in mind that any policy available to 
address European security after the end of the Cold War carried costs and benefits of some kind. 
The core question facing analysts evaluating the legacy of NATO enlargement is not whether 
enlargement was normatively good or bad, but in what aspects enlargement yielded positive or 
negative effects and how those compare to the effects of the alternatives available.  
 
International Debates 
The first set of issues addressed in this volume concerns enlargement’s international consequences 
and, in particular, its effects on the primary players vis-à-vis enlargement: Russia, the United 
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States, and non-US NATO members. Here, scholarly and policy attention tends to fix on NATO 
members’ relations with Russia. When the possibility of enlargement was first broached, many 
analysts and former policymakers cautioned that it would sully East-West relations by rousing 
Russian suspicions and redivide the continent (e.g., Brown 1995; Mandelbaum 1995, 9–13; 
Friedman 1998). As noted, Russian policymakers railed against the policy starting in the early 
1990s, just as US analysts strove to reconcile NATO enlargement with Russian concerns.  
With the downturn in East-West relations beginning in the late 2000s, the question became 
whether and to what extent the collapse of Moscow’s relationship with the United States and its 
allies was at least partly a response to NATO enlargement. Certainly many Russian officials and 
a number of Western analysts view East-West tensions in these terms, treating NATO enlargement 
as a major source of Russian insecurity and thus a significant factor in prompting Moscow’s recent 
bellicosity (e.g., Herszenhorn 2014; Matlock 2014; Mearsheimer 2014). Given that the NATO 
expansion discussion began in the early 1990s, however, and yet East-West relations did not 
worsen until the 2000s, there are debates over the extent of causality (Marten 2015, 2018; McFaul, 
Sestanovich, and Mearsheimer 2014).  
The question remains: To what extent, if any, did NATO enlargement prompt deterioration 
in East-West relations from their initial post–Cold War high, and how does enlargement compare 
to other policies (e.g., the wars against Serbia, Iraq, and Libya, and Western support for civil 
society in Russia and other post-Soviet states) in the panoply of Russian grievances? Closely 
linked to this is an ongoing policy issue: Given current attitudes in Washington, Moscow, and 
beyond, would a credible end to further NATO enlargement substantially improve East-West 
dynamics, particularly if the alliance committed not to extend further into the former Soviet Union 
(O’Hanlon 2017; Rumer and Sokolosky 2019)? 
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 If relations with Russia present one criterion for evaluating the international consequences 
of enlargement, then US grand strategy offers another. The United States is the largest member of 
NATO financially, militarily, and demographically, and has long been the principal proponent of 
enlargement inside the alliance. Although US policymakers were not always fixed on expanding 
the alliance, the last quarter century has seen enlargement occupy a progressively more prominent 
place in US strategic discussions vis-à-vis Europe (Porter 2018). Still, the growing centrality of 
enlargement is not universally accepted as a net gain for the United States (Kay 1998, 103–114). 
Proponents see the link between the United States and an expanded NATO as contributing to 
European peace and economic growth in ways that redound to the United States’ advantage 
(Brooks and Wohlforth 2016, 115–118, 171–184; Brands 2016, 3). Critics, however, allege that 
treating NATO and its continued ability to expand as the lodestone of US engagement in Europe 
is problematic; not only does it encourage allies to cheap-ride on US security largesse, but it may 
encourage risky allied behaviors that can ensnare the United States in a broader set of security 
problems than it would otherwise face (Posen 2019; Walt 2017). In other words, NATO 
enlargement might be in the interests of the new member states, but might not bolster US security. 
 Still a third lens through which to evaluate the international consequences of enlargement 
concerns its effect on non-US NATO members. At the start of NATO enlargement, many 
policymakers in non-US NATO member states—including leaders in the United Kingdom, France, 
and Germany—were lukewarm about enlargement (Waltz 2000; Wolff 2000). Echoing skeptics in 
the United States, even policymakers who wanted to sustain NATO questioned the rationale for 
the alliance taking on new members and expanding its security obligations in Europe at a time 
when defense budgets were falling. To what degree have such concerns been vindicated by 
subsequent events, or been proved overly skeptical? On the other hand, the end of the Cold War 
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left countries formerly under Soviet domination without a natural security anchor and facing great 
uncertainty over their relations with Russia and their immediate neighbors. Admission into NATO 
could help solve these problems while further adding the prestige of joining with the winning side 
in the Cold War and the benefits of aligning with the United States at the height of its power. A 
thorough analysis should probe whether these advantages have accrued in the form intended. 
NATO went east while trying to accommodate competing imperatives by limiting NATO’s 
military presence around Eastern Europe, engaging Russia (albeit in limited form) to forestall the 
possibility of a military confrontation, and insulating the process from domestic and foreign critics. 
Twenty-five years later, the effort to harmonize the West’s myriad goals after the Cold War has 
demonstrably failed. Tensions with Russia are spiking, NATO planners confront the possibility 
that the alliance might need to undertake military action in Eastern Europe, and there are ongoing 
discussions about permanently stationing forces beyond Germany. Currently, it is unclear whether 
NATO’s security commitments to Eastern Europe are viable—that is, whether the alliance has 
military options to protect states in the area at an acceptable political and strategic price. Questions 
also remain over (1) the willingness and/or ability of NATO’s traditional members to secure 
Eastern Europe in whole or in part, and (2) whether other security options exist for structuring 
Western and/or Eastern European security. Scholars thus need to know the extent to which NATO 
can credibly honor commitments to its post–Cold War members, as well as how enlargement has 
altered Europe’s security architecture and the nature of security problems on the continent. 
Underlying all this is a basic counterfactual: All things being equal, are NATO’s members better 
or worse off with the alliance having expanded after the Cold War?  
  
Domestic Level Considerations 
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The domestic consequences of NATO expansion provide another way of evaluating enlargement’s 
legacy.  Policymakers must generate political backing for any foreign policy initiative, especially 
if it is to prove sustainable (Hagan 1995, 122–124; Foyle 1999; Howell and Pevehouse 2007). 
Objectives must be clarified and tools to obtain those objectives identified to give guidance to the 
organs of government and to address domestic critics.5 Above all, policymakers must engage 
domestic constituencies to encourage domestic winners from any policy while placating any losers 
(Mayer 1992; Friman 1993). NATO enlargement—with its contentious domestic debates and 
implications for European security—is no exception. Further, domestic politics are often shaped 
by international politics, raising debates over how domestic security discussions are colored by the 
international repercussions (for good and for ill) of NATO’s eastward move (Gourevitch 1978). 
This dynamic has been on display in many NATO members. The US case is instructive. 
At the start of the enlargement debate in the early 1990s, the scope of the pro-enlargement coalition 
remained unclear. A number of senior officials in the Bush and Clinton administrations supported 
the initiative. Still, opposition came from certain quarters of the Departments of State and 
Defense—where officials worried about relations with Russia, the provision of new security 
guarantees, or both—as well as from some senior Congressional leaders, such as Georgia senator 
Sam Nunn, and from a range of analysts in the academy and at think tanks (Stuart 1996, esp. table 
1). By the fall of 1994, however, the internal enlargement debate was largely over even if some 
opposition to the policy remained, particularly at the Pentagon. The political coalition that enabled 
enlargement to go forward in the coming years was taking shape. Proponents inside the Clinton 
administration emphasized enlargement as a tool of democracy promotion in Central and Eastern 
 
5 An example illustrates the point. As the historian John Lewis Gaddis noted in Strategies of Containment, a major 
difficulty confronting the United States’ initial approach to containment was the inability of George Kennan—its 
principal architect—to clarify the strategy’s objectives for those charged with implementing the policy; see Gaddis 
1982, 53–86. 
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Europe while Republicans on Capitol Hill, who gave enlargement a push in their 1994 Contract 
with America, were intent on showing their resolve to defend the newly free areas of Central and 
Eastern Europe from possible Russian revanchism. Both groups sought in part to appeal to voters 
of Eastern European descent, who were viewed as important constituencies in key midwestern 
states (Goldgeier 1999, 73–85).  
Soon, a strong domestic consensus favoring enlargement formed and became predominant 
in US policymaking circles (Porter 2018). Alternative approaches discussed in the early to mid 
1990s, such as emphasizing NATO’s Partnership for Peace, using CSCE as the basis for a pan-
European security architecture, or encouraging security solutions in Eastern Europe through the 
European Union, fell by the wayside as policymakers treated an expanded NATO as the crux of 
the United States’ post–Cold War efforts to craft a Europe whole, free, and at peace (Kornblum 
2019).   
More dramatically, US policymakers on both sides of the political aisle have made support 
for NATO’s presence in Europe and continued expansion eastward a lodestone of US strategy. 
Senior officials from both parties regularly pledge US fidelity to the alliance, whereas suggestions 
that the United States might not fully embrace the alliance—as some inferred from Trump’s failure 
to commit to NATO’s Article V security guarantees early in his presidency—have been criticized 
(Wright 2017). This consensus, however, raises two interrelated issues central to understanding 
the course and consequences of NATO enlargement in US foreign policy. First, why did an 
enlargement consensus rapidly take hold in Washington, swamp challengers, and dominate policy 
discussions? Second, and more difficult to assess, is the strategic question: What, if any, strategic 
risks follow from treating NATO in its post–Cold War borders as the central pillar of US 
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engagement in Europe and bypassing consideration of alternative options in shaping the US 
approach toward Europe? 
In important ways, the Russian debate was the mirror image of that in the United States. 
As the Soviet Union broke apart, Yeltsin and many of the Russian reformers around him sought a 
cooperative relationship with the United States and NATO, seeing NATO’s continuation as an 
element of stability in the post–Cold War world. As, however, it became increasingly clear that 
NATO was to expand into Eastern Europe, Russian opposition spiked. As early as the mid-1990s, 
Yeltsin and some of his advisers warned Clinton that enlargement would empower Russian 
nationalists, threaten reformers’ tenure, and endanger vital Russian interests (Goldgeier and 
McFaul 2003, 183-210). Moreover, Russian discomfort remained even after Clinton responded by 
delaying enlargement until after Yeltsin’s 1996 reelection—and became especially salient once 
former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states began entering the alliance from the late 1990s.  
Seemingly both playing to and reifying the resulting sense of what many analysts describe 
as ‘humiliation’, Russian presidents Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev have made opposition 
to NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe a tenet of their foreign agenda and domestic narratives 
since the mid-2000s. Significantly, there is ongoing scholarly and policy discussion over whether 
this opposition primarily stems from genuine security concerns or from politically useful appeals 
to Russian nationalism (Mydans 2004; Eurasia News 2018; Sweeney 2010). Still, any assessment 
of NATO enlargement must grapple with the extent to which (1) it undercut Russian proponents 
of a more cooperative East-West relationship since the 1990s, and (2) the prospect of future 
expansion empowers Russian hawks today. Answers to these questions are of more than historical 
interest—they can help guide strategists seeking to stabilize relations with Moscow. 
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With regard to non-US NATO members, two distinct domestic considerations merit 
engagement. The first concerns political support for NATO versus its continental competitors. As 
noted, it was not impossible after the Cold War to imagine that NATO would gradually be 
supplanted by various European-based security schemes. Indeed, even after agreeing in the early 
1990s that NATO would remain the primary venue for European security discussions, efforts to 
construct semi-independent European security arrangements under EU auspices continued, 
ranging from the European Security and Defense Initiative to the more recent Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (NATO Review 2000; DW 2017). These designs have often failed to meet 
their stated operational intentions.6 Nevertheless, given ongoing European efforts and the 
mismatch between desired ends and outcomes, how has NATO enlargement affected the intra-
European debate over an independent European security identity and, alongside it, support for 
NATO? 
The second consideration is the domestic political fallout of NATO enlargement. This is 
highly relevant for those Eastern European states that entered the alliance after the Cold War. 
When first broached, NATO enlargement was presented as a way of (1) fostering economic and 
political liberalism in former communist states, and (2) helping these countries adjust their security 
and foreign policies so as to diminish the risk of violence in the region (Asmus, Kugler, and 
Flanagan 1993, inter alia). In furthering these goals, however, NATO enlargement plausibly 
created domestic political winners (e.g., political reformers, military reformers, and economically 
competitive industries) and losers (e.g., those seeking an independent Eastern Europe, traditional 
security sectors, etc.). Two decades of peace and stability in and around Eastern Europe long 
seemed to validate the claims of enlargement’s proponents (Epstein 2005; Thies, Hellmuth, and 
 
6 That said, they may be fostering deeper institutional integration; see Zielinski and Schilde forthcoming. 
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Millen 2006; Lanoszka, this issue). However, democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland—
and the risk of further backsliding in other NATO members—has reopened the debate (Wallander 
2018; Burns and Lute 2019, 18–21). If nothing else, recent changes highlight that the domestic 
political consequences of NATO membership have not been entirely resolved. It therefore remains 
an open issue whether NATO enlargement has truly delivered on the domestic transformations 
highlighted by expansion proponents. On balance, has NATO helped these countries transition to 
liberal democratic capitalism while managing the domestic fallout from these changes, or is the 
post–Cold War status quo more fraught than proponents of enlargement would claim? 
 
Organizational Impact 
Finally, and separate from the international and domestic repercussions of NATO enlargement, 
are enlargement’s consequences for the alliance as an organization. To be sure, NATO—like other 
institutions—only exists at the behest of its members; it does not exert independent agency in 
world politics (Mearsheimer 1994, 13–14). Still, to the extent that its members aggregate resources 
via the alliance, it is worth investigating how NATO’s eastward move has affected the alliance’s 
ability to perform needed security functions. After all, NATO is first and foremost a military 
alliance. Hence, if the alliance is to meet its commitments and address the interests of its members, 
it must be able to conduct the military missions necessary to these ends (Waltz 2000, 32–34). 
Assessing enlargement’s effects on the alliance as a military organization tasked with preparing 
for and deterring conflict is therefore as important as assessing its consequences internationally or 
domestically. 
One set of issues concerns the coherence of the alliance. During the Cold War, NATO 
members invested significant time and energy in structuring the alliance to erect a plausible 
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defense against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies (Duffield 1995; Kugler 1991; Davis 
2008). Battle lines were sorted out; competing military doctrines were tested, evaluated, and 
integrated; military equipment was standardized so far as rival defense requirements and industrial 
bases allowed; command and control obligations were established; and military exercises allowed 
the alliance to train to fight as a more or less coherent unit. Faced with the prospect of NATO 
enlargement in the early to mid 1990s, critics argued that such tasks would be difficult to replicate 
if NATO moved eastward. By this logic, the alliance might increase in breadth but sacrifice depth 
by taking in new member states with little experience in Western approaches to defense, at a time 
of falling military budgets and absent a pressing external threat to give impetus to sorting out the 
array of tasks modern militaries must undertake when fighting with partners (Clemens 1997, 353–
357). 
Hints of problems along these lines emerged in NATO operations in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, where even longstanding allies faced interoperability problems, as well as difficulties 
in sharing intelligence and structuring rules of engagement (Giegerich and von Hlatky 2019; 
Auerswald and Saideman 2000; Frontline 2000; Department of Defense 1999). Still, so long as 
NATO did not face the prospect of having conflict forced upon it, the risks seemed tolerable. 
Confronted, however, with resurgent tensions with Russia after the mid-2000s, the alliance has 
found itself working to accommodate the renewed possibility of high-intensity combat operations 
against a capable challenger (Binnenijik and Priebe 2019; Barrie et al 2019, inter alia). 
Accordingly, analysts need an accounting of the ways in which enlargement has shaped NATO’s 
ability to craft an effective response to the alliance’s contemporary military challenges, alongside 
its successes and failures in adjusting to post–Cold War military missions in Europe and beyond. 
 25 
Related to the preceding is the question of NATO’s credibility along its eastern flank 
(Shlapak and Johnson 2016, 3–4; Simón 2014, 67). Once NATO added the Baltic states as 
members, it eliminated most of the geographic barriers separating NATO and Russian military 
forces that had obtained since the breakup of the Soviet Union. At the time, enlargement skeptics 
challenged the logic of these moves, questioning whether NATO could meet its security 
obligations under such conditions (Hendrickson and Spohr 2004, 327–328). Proponents, however, 
emphasized that further expansion would reinforce Western security by helping to engage Russia, 
expand the alliance’s reach, and foster European contributions to collective security and military 
contingencies; although unstated, it may also have been seen as a way of bolstering deterrence by 
increasing NATO’s ability to deter or dissuade challenges (US Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations 2003). With the growth of NATO-Russian tensions over the last decade, these competing 
logics have been put to the test, with policymakers struggling to adapt the organization for 
deterrence along NATO’s new eastern flank. The question thus becomes: To what extent has 
enlargement helped or hindered NATO’s ability to address post–Cold European military scenarios, 
especially those involving states near Russia’s border? 
Last, and perhaps most fundamental, are debates over enlargement’s effects on the 
alliance’s foundational purpose. Despite having been formed in large part to balance the Soviet 
Union, NATO—at least rhetorically—was presented after the Cold War as a collective security 
rather than a collective defense organization, with a general security purpose no longer oriented 
against Russia (Yost 1998; Flanagan 1992, 142). In principle, this meant that the alliance would 
function as much to address the broader security concerns of NATO members (and, presumably 
other actors) as it would to defend them from attack from an outside country. How was the alliance 
repackaged for this task? As importantly, and given efforts such as the deployment of rotational 
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military forces to the Baltic States and creation of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, 
to what extent is NATO adjusting itself to accommodate a new period of military tensions in 
Europe? Has the expanded alliance successfully refocused for today’s collective defense missions, 
or does collective security—and perhaps further enlargement—still generate a pull in NATO 
circles? Moreover, in a period of renewed tensions with Russia, is refocusing on collective defense 
made more difficult with a geographically enlarged alliance that includes a diverse group of new 
member states? Evaluating NATO expansion, in short, requires understanding how enlargement 
has simultaneously reflected and affected the organization’s own understanding of its role in 
European security. 
 
The Role of Counterfactual Analysis and Inference  
As the preceding section implies, any consideration of the costs and benefits of NATO enlargement 
relies on at least one of two methodological options. The first is counterfactual analysis (Van Evera 
1997, 25–26, 48; George and Bennett 2005, 167–168; Tetlock and Belkin, 1996). Counterfactuals 
rely on comparing the outcomes of interest in the case(s) at hand with the outcomes in a 
hypothetical case in which the independent variable in question (here, NATO enlargement) is 
absent or valued differently. James Fearon describes the logic:  
 
Suppose it is hypothesized that C was a cause of event E…. [W]hen experimental 
control and replication are not possible, analysts have available a choice between 
two and only two strategies for ‘empirically’ testing this hypothesis. Either they can 
imagine that C had been absent and ask whether E would have (or might have) 
occurred in that counterfactual case; or they can search for other actual cases that 
resemble the case in question in significant respects, except that in some of these 
cases C is absent (or had a different value). (1991, 171) 
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Clearly, this method is difficult to execute and often yields contentious findings (George and 
Bennett 2005, 230–231). Indeed, the causal weight assigned to any independent variable is often 
subject to debate in any body of social science or work of history, thereby leaving counterfactual 
arguments contestable and the results potentially suspect. Nevertheless, we believe the approach 
offers analytic utility in the NATO enlargement case.  
On one level, the more analysts can offer a plausible explanation for why the case(s) 
observed occurred as they did—particularly one using general theoretical or historical 
arguments—the greater the ability to leverage counterfactual analysis by asking how a causal chain 
would have played out if a certain independent variable were valued differently. This is a viable 
option in the context of NATO enlargement given the robust literatures describing the predicted 
and actual consequences of enlargement. Simply put, the alleged causal chains linked to 
enlargement (or the lack thereof) are often already specified or suggested in different literatures. 
This situation allows scholars to directly consider counterfactuals by leveraging the received 
wisdom while asking (1) whether the outcome(s) in question are clearly related to the alleged 
causes, and (2) whether and to what degree alternative outcomes would have occurred had these 
causes been absent.  
At the same time, we believe it is unnecessary to adopt a strict counterfactual approach—
one that relies on varying as little as possible of the historical record to consider alternative 
outcomes—to detail and evaluate the overaching consequences of enlargement. As noted earlier 
in this piece and discussed in greater detail in several of the articles in this issue, a number of 
alternatives to NATO enlargement have either been considered at various points, or are suggested 
by the history. Accordingly, a looser counterfactual approach—one that highlights plausible 
outcomes and processes that might have obtained if NATO enlargement had not occurred as it did 
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while holding constant background conditions at the time—suffices to generate an informed 
judgment of NATO enlargement’s results. This modified logic allows scholars to employ a 
historically grounded approach that leverages the arguments, expectations, and approaches of 
actors involved to investigate not only the role of NATO enlargement in the outcomes of interest, 
but also highlight potential alternate outcomes that might have come about had expansion not 
occurred or occurred in a different form.7  
 This is not the first project to leverage counterfactuals to engage the NATO enlargement 
debate (Marten 2018). The articles in this issue build upon existing work by considering a broad 
set of issues affected by NATO expansion and, in many instances, discussing a range of alternative 
policies that were discussed at various points over the past quarter century. This expanded set of 
counterfactuals helps to re-evaluate prominent issues such as whether the West might have avoided 
poor relations with Russia, alongside subtler concerns such as whether there were alternative ways 
of promoting democratic reform across Central and Eastern Europe or fostering European security 
after the Cold War. Put simply, counterfactual analysis in some form is critical both for assessing 
whether a different policy would have produced a distinctly different result (e.g., a different 
outcome in US-Russia relations), and for weighing the costs and benefits of the policy chosen 
relative to its primary alternatives.  
 The second methodological option for evaluating the costs and benefits of NATO 
enlargement relies on the logic of process tracing, that is, rigorously assessing sequences of events 
within a single episode in order to determine the mechanisms through and conditions under which 
an outcome occurred (George and Bennett 2005, 205–232; Bennett and Checkel 2015). This 
approach is especially useful in helping to determine the relative salience of NATO enlargement 
 
7 In Fearon’s terms, we are interested not only in whether Cause C is linked to Outcome E, but in further identifying 
what outcomes instead of E would have obtained if C were absent. 
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compared with other factors affecting the current state of European security affairs. At root, NATO 
enlargement is not the only variable shaping contemporary European security, be it on issues of 
East-West dynamics and the security of NATO’s eastern flank, or questions about alliance burden 
sharing, doctrine, and command and control procedures. European politics have been influenced 
by domestic political debates in the United States and elsewhere, external events (e.g., conflicts in 
the Middle East), the growth of other security structures, changing leadership priorities, and other 
variables that are only loosely (if at all) connected with NATO’s expansion.  
Thus, in addition to determining how NATO enlargement affected European security given 
plausible roads not taken, it is also important to investigate the degee to which NATO enlargement 
is responsible for the current state of European security affairs compared to the other factors that 
may be at work. Process tracing can assist in this task by providing a framework within which 
analysts can assess whether, why, and how NATO enlargement and/or other variables shaped the 
range of outcomes (e.g., NATO operational difficulties, democratization in Eastern Europe) of 
interest in these studies. The key in doing so—as several studies in this issue highlight—is to 
carefully reconstruct the history and causal pathways involved while asking whether NATO’s 
expansion played a necessary, sufficient, or contributing role. 
 
Summarizing the Results   
What, then, do the scholars in this special issue find? In lieu of an overarching net assessment, the 
results of this study showcase that the consequence of NATO enlargement have varied by the 
actors involved even when counterfactuals are considered. Overall, the results for the United States 
have been decidedly mixed. Although reinforcing US influence and dominance in Europe, 
enlargement has also obligated the United States to take on additional security commitments with 
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less oversight of the issues involved while antagonizing Russia. Enlargement did not uniquely 
cause Russian aggrandizement or opposition toward the West, but NATO’s post–Cold War 
centrality and Washington’s growing ambivalence toward Russian concerns about continued 
NATO enlargement certainly contributed to the downturn in East-West relations.  
Enlargement had advantages and drawbacks for Western Europe as well. Although the 
region’s members states have been able to cheap-ride on US security guarantees as part of the 
NATO enlargement deal, expansion has also undercut Western Europe’s push to craft a separate 
security apparatus and increased its dependence on the United States for hard security. NATO as 
an organization has experienced similar dynamics. On the one hand, enlargement increased the 
reach of the organization. Nevertheless, it also hollowed out NATO’s military capabilities while 
increasing notional security commitments. Eastern European states, conversely, seem to have 
largely benefited from the alliance’s eastward drive. NATO expansion may not have been 
necessary for their liberalization and reform, but it likely helped them obtain more security than 
they could have achieved on their own. 
 
Previewing the Analyses 
From historian Timothy Andrews Sayle’s perspective, the age-old adage that NATO was there ‘to 
keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in’ guided decisionmaking after the 
Cold War as it had earlier. Though some Western and Russian policymakes occasionally mused 
that Russia might at some point join NATO, Sayle highlights the pervasive concern that letting the 
Russians into the Alliance would bring trouble. Despite Western outreach, there was therefore a 
limit on how far Western engagers were willing to go with Russia even as NATO was repackaged 
as a collective security organization for post–Cold War Europe. Nor was mistrust of policymakers 
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in Moscow the only continuity with the Cold War period, as German unification kept the German 
question alive. In fact, Sayle writes, ‘By the end of the Cold War, Margaret Thatcher was keeping 
a map in her handbag that showed the expansion of German territory over time’. Meanwhile, the 
Americans, too, wanted to stay in—a call echoed by more than a few Western and European 
actors—and NATO was the way to that end. Given this trifecta, and given NATO’s Cold War–era 
expansion, Sayle argues that the strategic rationale for enlargement to Eastern Europe was strongly 
present even at the dawn of the post–Cold War era. 
Still, even if the logic for NATO enlargement was present at the creation, it is nevertheless 
puzzling that enlargement has become a pervasive and durable theme in European security 
discussions given the alternatives available and opposition (at least early on) to the policy. To this 
end, Joshua Shifrinson examines the drivers of what he terms the ‘enlargement consensus’ in US 
foreign policy and the consequences thereof. Laying out a series of hypotheses drawn from 
international relations (IR) theory and policy discussions that might explain the sustained push for 
enlargement, he finds that each explains some aspect of US policy toward expansion without 
capturing the overarching trend. Instead, Shifrinson argues that the enlargement consensus 
emerged because of a ‘perfect storm of systemic and domestic conditions’—including a US 
leadership seeking preeminence in Europe, Russian weakness, and a policymaking system that 
limited reconsideration of the roads taken—that swamped possible alternatives. Regardless, the 
process has generated mixed results at best for US national security. Although enlargement may 
have helped pacify Eastern Europe and garnered US leverage over political and security affairs in 
Western Europe, it has come at the expense of limited flexibility with and tendency to overreact 
to Russia, alongside allied cheap-riding.  
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If Shifrinson finds the results mixed, William Ruger and Rajan Menon argue that 
enlargement has been a disaster for the United States. In their telling, enlargement has 
compromised US national security by antagonizing Russia, increasing the tendency of European 
allies to free-ride, and requiring the United States to protect a series of weak and vulnerable states 
of questionable relevance to US interests.  Driving this dynamic—they argue—has been the 
United States’ post–Cold War primacist grand strategy and the tendency to use NATO as a tool of 
US power maximization. Their conclusion is stark and provocative: the best path forward for the 
United States is attempting to improve burden sharing within an expanded alliance, reengaging 
with Russia, and potentially reducing US security commitments in Europe. 
 What, then, of Russia? Examining the West’s relations with Russia, Kimberly Marten 
observes that NATO enlargement is not ‘a discrete event in the panoply of Russia’s security 
relationship with the West’. Rather, Western policy after the Cold War provided plenty of fodder 
for Russian resentment. This included NATO’s 1995 NATO airstrikes against Serbia, the 1999 
Kosovo War, the 2003 Iraq War, and Western backing for the ‘color revolutions’ in states around 
Russia’s periphery from 2003–2005. Given this, Marten proposes that the decline of Western-
Russian relations was overdetermined and NATO enlargement hardly a decisive factor. Instead, 
to the extent that enlargement contributed to current tensions, it was not because NATO threatened 
Russia, but because expansion highlighted Russia’s declining status. In the Russian assessment, 
the United States acted as if Russian interests were of limited importance and could be shaped by 
the West. Meanwhile, each side retained incompatible visions for the non-Baltic states of the 
former Soviet Union. The United States and its allies believed these countries were free to choose 
their own futures, whereas Russia believed that they belonged to its privileged sphere of influence. 
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NATO enlargement may thus have reinforced Russian opposition to Western policy, but it was 
simply one factor among many in the renewal of estrangement. 
Like Marten, Andrey Sushenstov and William Wohlforth underscore that NATO 
enlargement did not cause Western relations with Moscow to plummet. Instead, the continued 
centrality of NATO—itself a cardinal point of US policy—as a security organization after the Cold 
War antagonized Russia by limiting its ability to shape European security developments. This, in 
conjunction with Russia’s desire to exert influence after the Cold War, primed European politics 
for Russian revisionism. Still, with the United States and its partners looking to use NATO to 
reshape European politics, revisionism was a two-way street. Just as the West responded to the 
threat of Russian revanchism, so too did Russia respond to Western revisionist impulses. 
Sushenstov and Wohlforth therefore reach the powerful conclusion that the estrangement of 
NATO and Russia over the post–Cold War period ‘is best understood as an offensive-realist 
tragedy as opposed to a morality play with only one side in the bad guy role’. At root, ‘both Russia 
and the United States were revisionists’. 
Just as NATO enlargement affected the United States and Russia, so too has it affected 
NATO’s other members along with transatlantic and European politics (broadly defined). Several 
of the articles capture the range of internal and external consequences involved. Alexander 
Lanoszka argues that NATO enlargement has proven strongly beneficial for Europe and carried 
few negative consequences. The prime benefit comes from an expanded NATO having offered a 
needed hedge against Russian attempts to reconstitute the former Soviet empire and more generally 
assert itself in its near abroad. By extension, had NATO not enlarged, one would not see the 
broadly stable Eastern Europe nor the comparatively geographically and strategically constrained 
Russia of today. At the same time, the costs of expansion have been limited. In this assessment, 
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not only can NATO successfully extend deterrence to eastern-flank countries that might seem 
difficult to secure, but even ostensible limits and drawbacks to enlargement (e.g., the eroding 
relationship with Moscow and democratic backsliding in Eastern Europe) are difficult to link to 
NATO expansion. Lanoszka thus concludes that, with costs low and benefits high, expansion has 
been a boon for Europe—or, as he pithily puts it, ‘thank goodness for NATO enlargement’. 
Taking a different tack, Paul Poast and Alexandra Chinchilla challenge the idea that NATO 
expansion was, as many analysts and policymakers claim, responsible for democratic 
consolidation across Eastern Europe after 1991. By looking at the timing of democratization in 
states in the region, comparing across cases, and leveraging the fact that different states entered 
NATO at different times, they report that it was anticipation of membership in the European Union 
rather than NATO that primarily drove democratic development. In fact, Poast and Chinchilla even 
find that efforts to link democratization with NATO membership have been ‘inconsistently 
applied’. Rather than being directly causal, NATO primarily affected the establishment of civilian 
control over the military—certainly an important political development, but hardly supporting the 
claim that enlargement facilitated and ensured democracy. Although it may still be the case that 
NATO enlargement was necessary for EU engagement in Eastern Europe (Talbott 2019, 409), the 
result raises important questions surrounding the domestic consequences of expansion for NATO’s 
newer member states.  
Nor are the United States, Russia, and NATO’s European members the only states affected 
by enlargement. Importantly, Susan Colbourn reminds us that there is not one North American 
NATO member, but two. Like the United States, Canada sought to remain involved in Europe after 
the Cold War and, to a degree seldom appreciated, helped push NATO’s expansion. Drawing on 
recently declassified Canadian sources, Colbourn recounts how Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
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signaled his interest in enlargement as early as September 1991, seeking to ‘prod the Bush 
administration and our other allies into taking the necessary next step in the continuing evolution 
of East-West relations’. Furthermore, when the Partnership for Peace was proposed, Canadian 
policymakers were eager that it provide Eastern European states with a path to full membership in 
the alliance rather than offering a permanent waiting room. Driving this push was a mixture of 
memory and ambition. Ultimately, not only did Canadian leaders see NATO expansion as a way 
of retaining the alliance’s importance to post–Cold War security discussions, but doing so would 
ensure a Canadian voice in European security debates—no small concern given Canada’s 
sacrifices in two world wars and the long struggle with the Soviet Union.  
As for organizational consequences, Sara Moller examines the impact of NATO 
enlargement on its role as a regional defensive alliance. Her conclusion is stark: ‘At both the 
strategic and military level’, she writes, ‘NATO enlargement was poorly planned and 
implemented’. Because security considerations were never at the root of the Western decisions to 
enlarge the alliance, the United States and its allies did not engage the implications of expansion 
for NATO’s core military functions. Indeed, at the start of enlargement in the early to mid 1990s, 
planners assumed that the military environment would remain broadly hospitable for the indefinite 
future (irrespective of talk of possibly needing to hedge against Russian revisionism). ‘Officially’, 
Moller offers, ‘NATO declared it would invite candidates for membership using the criteria 
identified in the so-called “Perry Principles”—collective defense, democracy, consensus, and 
collective security.… In practice, the Allies agreed to overlook the first principle in favor of the 
other three in order to implement NATO enlargement quickly’. This tendency to overlook defense 
issues continued into the 2000s as NATO spread across the continent. With the return of military 
tensions with Russia, the enlarged alliance thereby faces real difficulties in generating consensus 
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about the scope of extant military problems, as well as allocating appropriate attention and 
resources. 
In addition to imperiling NATO’s collective defense functions, enlargement also undercut 
European military capabilities. Here, as Paul van Hooft’s article shows, the United States’ single-
minded focus on making NATO the primary security venue in continental Europe and retaining 
US oversight of the alliance stifled European efforts to build independent capabilities. This 
manifested collectively (e.g., contributing to the limited success of different European Union 
military-security arrangements) and individually (encouraging European member states to 
underinvest in their own military forces). Needless to say, this process has left both the 
organization and the United States (as NATO’s main security patron) overexposed. As van Hooft 
writes, ‘The U.S. insistence that NATO was the only game in town and then using it as an all-
purpose tool for U.S. foreign policy interests, ensure that the U.S. increased the demands on its 
resources and that there are few states or institutions the U.S. can pass costs off to’. Collectively, 
van Hooft’s findings amount to a strong argument that NATO enlargement, at least in the form 
practiced since the 1990s, has left European defenses less robust than might have otherwise been 
the case. 
Ultimately, as Stéfanie von Hlatky and Michael Fortmann show, NATO has been torn 
between two conflicting impulses. Prior to enlargement, many NATO members sought to move 
NATO away from its Cold War–era collective defense mission toward serving as a cooperative 
security institution that would limit interstate tensions and conflict before they began. With 
enlargement, however, this impulse was challenged and eventually undermined by NATO’s new 
Eastern European members, which, although paying lip service to cooperative security, primarily 
saw NATO as an insurance policy against Russia. These impulses were clearly in conflict, yet 
 37 
were not—indeed, could not—be reconciled. As a consequence, whereas the demands for 
collective defense went up thanks to enlargement (and Russia’s eventual reaction), the will and 
ability of all NATO members to provide for that defense languished for much of the post–Cold 
War period. It may well be the case that Russia is deterred by the prospect of NATO collective 
action in defense of its Eastern European member states but, at the military level, the organization 
is now hurriedly trying to make up for lost time.  
 
Conclusion: Toward a Research Agenda  
The articles in this special issue are designed to begin the process of evaluating the legacy of 
NATO enlargement at a time when the alliance’s future remains uncertain. Insofar as future 
enlargement remains a possibility, this effort can help policymakers and scholars alike assess the 
merits and drawbacks of expanding NATO’s commitments still further. Conversely, it may also 
help identify the opportunities, risks, and limitations of capping or even curtailing NATO’s 
existing obligations. Ultimately, the more enlargement is linked to outcomes believed to promote 
a positive security environment for NATO member states, the stronger the case for expansion; the 
looser that connection, or the more expansion is found to have contributed to problematic security 
results, the stronger the case for capping or walking back NATO’s presence. Baldly stated, 
rigorously evaluating NATO’s post–Cold War history can provide insight into NATO’s future. 
This special issue is not meant to be the last word on NATO expansion’s legacy—future 
work is needed to build on the results reported here. Four areas of research seem especially fruitful. 
First, future research may wish to further explore the themes discussed in this volume as new 
evidence comes to light. As an initial exercise in crafting a research agenda that speaks to 
contemporary policy concerns, the articles in this volume are necessarily limited in the data and 
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evidence at their disposal. Particularly as archives open, interviews accumulate, and evidence on 
military, political, and economic trends clarifies, analysts should subject the findings in this project 
to further scrutiny, and grapple with the topics raised in this forum using new tools and sources. 
Second, additional research may fruitfully explore the interaction between individual 
states’ strategies and the consequences of NATO enlargement. NATO enlargement did not happen 
in a vacuum. As enlargement rolled forward, different states within and outside of the alliance 
adjusted their policies to respond to the rush of events; by the same token, the enlargement process 
likely accounted for such developments as NATO itself accommodated new facts on the ground. 
Future work may wish to explore these dynamics and assess the process by which (1) individual 
states’ strategies affected the course and conduct of NATO enlargement, and (2) NATO 
enlargement influenced individual state foreign and security policies, as well as assessing the 
successes and failures witnessed along the way. 
Third, more work is needed to analyze the drivers of NATO enlargement both historically 
and in the contemporary world. To be sure, there is no dearth of discussion on the ostensible 
reasons the alliance has gone east and continues to do so. Still, scholars and analysts alike need to 
do more to probe whether these match the empirical record, as well as whether the stated reasons 
are true drivers of the phenomena, or simply rationles used to justify a policy arrived at for other 
reasons. This issue is one where combining historical research and social science techniques may 
yield particularly valuable insights. It may also allow scholars to fruitfully engage in policy 
debates, given the tendency for policymakers to craft narratives on the course and conduct of 
NATO expansion thus far in support of the alliance’s ongoing (and potentially growing) role 
throughout Europe. 
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Finally, it is worth considering how to weigh the salience of the successes and failures 
wrought by enlargement. The decision may stem from individual analysts’ preferences. For 
instance, two individuals could agree that US-Russia relations would have been more stable while 
Central and Eastern European states would have been worse off economically and politically 
absent enlargement, yet still disagree over the merits of this outcome. Those who prioritize 
relations between major powers, believe the absence of NATO’s expansion could have led to better 
US-Russia relations, and/or believe that other routes might have contributed to a stable Eastern 
Europe may be inclined to oppose enlargement; in contrast, those who emphasize the spread of 
liberal democracy, believe NATO was the only option for stability across Eastern Europe, and 
question whether the US-Russia relationship would have been markedly different without 
enlargement may favor expansion. We ourselves, for example, agree on how to go about evaluating 
the costs and benefits of enlargement but somewhat disagree on the merits of the policy because 
we place different weights and assign different probabilities to those different factors.  
In the final analysis, our purpose here is not to decide once and for all whether NATO 
enlargement was the right policy, but rather to improve the quality of the discussion surrounding 
the policy. Accordingly, additional research that tracks how individual analysts weigh the merits 
of particular outcomes, and/or identifies outcomes that individuals holding different preferences 
would still accept as salient, may help move the NATO enlargement debate forward. Likewise, by 
engaging research in IR theory, additional work may be able to link the outcomes associated with 
enlargement to broader insights about the factors and conditions that—ceteris paribus—contribute 
to peace, economic growth, political influence, and other broadly positive results. Needless to say, 
this provides another path toward weighing the salience of enlargement while connecting NATO 
expansion to more general IR theory discussions. 
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Ultimately, NATO enlargement has proven one of the most controversial and significant 
developments in foreign and security affairs since the end of the Cold War. Having begun at a time 
when European security and defense never seemed more propitious, the enlarged alliance now 
confronts a redivided Europe, a resurgent Russia, and renewed Western defense challenges. As 
noted, scholars, policymakers, and analysts disagree over enlargement’s role in contributing to this 
state of affairs. It is thus long overdue to directly engage the drivers, course, and consequences—
for better and for worse—of NATO expansion, across the range of issues and countries it affected. 
Nearly three decades on, scholars and policymakers alike need to understand exactly where and 
how NATO expansion met its objectives or faltered in its aspirations, and what analysts in the 
United States, Europe, and beyond can learn from the experience.  
